USA v. Saunders by unknown
2002 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-23-2002 
USA v. Saunders 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Saunders" (2002). 2002 Decisions. 30. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/30 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2002 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
                                                 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                      FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                           ___________ 
 
                           No. 01-2058                       
                           ___________ 
 
                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
                                 
                                v. 
                                 
          ERIC SPENCER SAUNDERS, a/k/a ERIC K. SPENCER 
                                 
                                         Eric Spencer Saunders, 
                                 
                                     Appellant 
                           ___________ 
 
         On Appeal from the United States District Court 
             for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 
    District Court Judge: The Honorable James F. McClure, Jr. 
                 (D.C. Criminal No. 00-cr-00072) 
                           ___________ 
 
           Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
                         January 8, 2002 
 
      Before: MANSMANN, RENDELL, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
                (Opinion Filed: January 22, 2002) 
                     ________________________ 
 
                        MEMORANDUM OPINION 
                     ________________________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
     Following a bench trial, Defendant Eric Spencer Saunders was 
convicted on April 
23, 2001 on one count of conspiracy to distribute and possession with 
intent to distribute 
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.  846 and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and 
one count of 
possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and aiding and abetting, 
in violation of 
21 U.S.C.  841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 18 U.S.C.  2.  Saunders 
was sentenced 
to ten years imprisonment.  He appeals, challenging the District Court's 
refusal to rely on 
an unpublished Pennsylvania Superior Court memorandum opinion in ruling on 
Saunders's motion to suppress.  Because we conclude that reliance on the 
unpublished 
opinion would be improper for all the reasons stated by the District 
Court, we affirm. 
                                I 
     Saunders's arrest arose from a traffic stop by Pennsylvania State 
Police Trooper 
Terrance Jankouskas.  Saunders moved to suppress the evidence seized from 
that stop, 
and Jankouskas testified at the suppression hearing.  In a post-hearing 
brief, Saunders 
challenged Jankouskas's credibility, and presented to the court two 
unpublished 
Pennsylvania Superior Court memorandum opinions.  In one of those cases, 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 01487 Philadelphia 1996, at 5 n.4, cited as 
Commonwealth v. 
Parker, 707 A.2d 551 (table) (Pa.Super.Ct.1997), Jankouskas signed the 
complaint and 
presumably was the arresting officer in an arrest arising from a vehicle 
stop.  The 
Pennsylvania Superior Court noted in a footnote that the trial court judge 
in Brown "had 
credibility concerns with the testimony of the arresting officer" because 
the judge found 
that "it was clearly the intention of the officer to induce a search."  
Id. 
     The District Court denied the suppression motion.  United States v. 
Griggs, 114 
F.Supp.2d 334 (M.D.Pa. 2000).  It stated that it would not consider the 
concerns raised in 
Brown because it is improper to cite to unpublished opinions and any 
credibility concerns 
in Brown had nothing to do with Saunders's case.  Id. at 351.  It also 
held that Brown is 
of questionable relevance because evidence of subjective intent may not be 
considered for 
suppression purposes.  The court observed that impeachment of Jankouskas 
with the 
statement in Brown was barred by the Federal Rules of Evidence because the 
impeachment material was not presented at the suppression hearing and 
subjected to 
cross-examination.  Id.  It concluded that Brown "is [not] of any 
practical use for present 
purposes and will not rely on [it] for any purpose."  Id. at 352. 
     We have jurisdiction over his appeal under 28 U.S.C.  1291.  
Saunders's counsel 
only appeals the refusal of the District Court to consider Brown in his 
suppression 
decision. 
 
                                II 
     "We review a district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence 
for abuse of 
discretion."  United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 326-27 (3d Cir. 
2001).  To the extent 
that the court's rulings "were based on an interpretation of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 
however, our review is plenary."  United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 
768 n.14 (3d 
Cir. 2000). 
     Saunders argues that although the District Court claimed that it is 
improper to cite 
to unpublished opinions, the court could have relied on Brown because 
Saunders sought 
to use it for reasons unrelated to its precedential value.  Yet as the 
District Court held, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court expressly bars usage of such opinions except 
under limited 
circumstances not present here.  As stated in every table reporting such 
opinions in the 
Atlantic Reporter, including Brown itself: 
                    An unpublished memorandum decision shall not be relied 
upon or cited by 
          a Court or party in any other action or proceeding, except that 
such a 
          memorandum decision may be relied upon or cited (1) when it is 
relevant 
          under the doctrine of law of the case, res judicata, or 
collateral estoppel, and 
          (2) when the memorandum is relevant to a criminal action or 
proceeding 
          because it recites issues raised and reasons for a decision 
affecting the same 
          defendant in a prior action or proceeding. 
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Parker, 707 A.2d 551 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1997) 
(table) (citing Pa. 
Super. Ct. R. 65.37) .  The District Court did not err in failing to rely 
on this unpublished 
opinion. 
     Further, the Pennsylvania Superior Court's offhand statement in a 
footnote to an 
unpublished opinion in an unrelated case simply has no bearing on 
credibility or any other 
suppression issue in this case, and is inadmissible in any event.  The 
District Court 
observed that because Saunders did not present Brown at the suppression 
hearing and 
Jankouskas was not cross-examined about it, under Federal Rule of Evidence 
608(b) it 
was improper for it to be used to impeach him.  We find no error in this 
conclusion.  
Saunders argues that the court had authority to "waive strict application" 
of Rule 608(b) 
because this dispute arose in a suppression context, not at trial.  Even 
if true, however, the 
court did not abuse its discretion by applying the rule nonetheless. 
     We find Saunders's additional arguments contesting the District 
Court's treatment 
of Brown to lack merit.  The District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in deciding not to 
rely on Brown, and did not err in its legal interpretation of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.  
We therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
      
_____________________________ 
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
 
Kindly file the foregoing Opinion. 
 
 
 
 
                                        /s/Julio M. Fuentes        
                                        Circuit Judge 
